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Abstract
Recent research on real options does not only consider optimal investment decisions
under risk, but also under ambiguity. However, most models that allow for ambiguity
are generally not dynamically consistent. Examples are, among others, the α-MEU
model, the imprecision aversion model, or the NMEU model. Dynamic consistency
is however required to solve optimal stopping real options problems analytically or
in closed-form. This paper highlights the resulting difficulties, which are often over-
looked, exemplarily for the NMEU model.
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1 Introduction
In the last decades, the real options literature has seen a tremendous development. Following
the seminal works by McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the standard
real options model has been applied to many areas in Economics and Finance, and has improved
our understanding of the firms’ investment decisions.
Real options timing and investment problems are usually modelled as optimal stopping problems
in continuous time with an infinite time horizon. As Dixit and Pindyck (1994) show, the recursive
structure of optimal stopping problems allows to transform them into non-stochastic Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman partial differential equations (HJB PDE), which can often be solved analytically.
While the real option approach traditionally focusses on assessing optimal investments under
risk, the work by Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) is the first to explore investment under another
type of uncertainty, called ambiguity. Different from risk, which refers to a situation with an
uncertain outcome where the probabilities for each of the outcomes are known, ambiguity denotes
the absence of accurate information on probabilities.
The contribution of Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) is to show that the combination of the maximin
expected utility (MEU) model by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) together with updating rule for
probabilities of strong rectangularity (Chen and Epstein, 2002; Epstein and Schneider, 2003)
allows preserving the recursive structure of optimal stopping problems under ambiguity.1 The
optimal investment rule is then derived by transforming the optimal stopping problem into a
HJB PDE, similar to Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
However, most models that allow for ambiguity are not dynamically consistent. Examples
include the α−MEU model by Ghiradato et al. (2004) as employed by Peijnenburg (2018), or
the NMEU model, as recently used in Gao et al. (2018). Dynamic consistency means that an
ex-ante optimal intertemporal (i.e., dynamic) decision plan is still optimal ex-post, as time goes
by. Put differently, a decision maker will never revise the ex-ante optimal plan at later points of
time.2 If preferences are not dynamically consistent, however, the recursive structure of optimal
stopping problems is generally lost. This paper highlights the resulting difficulties, which are
often overlooked, exemplarily for the NMEU model.
In a recent paper, Gao et al. (2018) examine the effect of ambiguity aversion on price negotiations
between buyers and sellers of goods and services. They extend the bilateral negotiation results of
Moon et al. (2011) to the case of ambiguity, and analyze how ambiguity and network structures
might affect buyer-seller interactions. To derive the optimal negotiation strategy of buyers and
sellers, the paper relies on the real options approach. They show that higher ambiguity aversion
raises the threshold for commitment for the seller, and that it has equivocal effects for the buyer’s
negotiation prospects.
Gao et al. (2018) model preferences under ambiguity using the multiple-priors expected utility
1The notion of rectangularity is introduced by Chen and Epstein (2002) and Epstein and Schneider (2003).
Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) refine the concept by introducing the notion of strong rectangularity.
2See Hill (2020) for a detailed discission on dynamic consistency.
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with non-extreme outcomes (NMEU). This preference model consists of taking a convex com-
bination of the minimum expected utility with respect to the set of priors (worst case scenario,
similar to Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), and the standard expected utility with respect to a
reference probability measure (objective scenario):
NMEU [x] = ρ inf
p∈P
Ep [x] + (1− ρ)E [x] (1)
where P is a set of probability distributions and ρ is a preference parameter denoting the degree
of ambiguity aversion. If ρ = 0, the model coincides with expected utility; if ρ = 1 the model is
equivalent to the maxmin expected utility by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).3
Following Nishimura and Ozaki (2007), Gao et al. (2018) express the seller’s and buyer’s negoti-
ating problem as an optimal stopping problem in continuous time, and transform it into an HJB
PDE. However, since NMEU preferences are generally not dynamically consistent, the optimal
stopping problems lack their recursive structure. As a result, the real options problem cannot
be solved analytically unless ρ = 0 or ρ = 1.
The next section of this note provides a formal argument why NMEU preference are generally not
dynamically consistent. Finally, section 3, discusses the implications of dynamic inconsistency
on optimal stopping problems, as used in the real options literature.
2 Dynamic inconsistency of NMEU preferences
Dynamic consistency of the expected utility model is due to the law of iterated expectations
(Epstein and Schneider, 2003):
Es[xu] = Es[Et[xu]] ∀s < t < u. (2)
Put differently, the expected value of a random variable x at time u should be the same regardless
whether the expectation is taken as of time s, or whether the expectation is first taken as of
time t, and then that expectation is taken at an earlier time s. For NMEU preferences to be
dynamically consistent, and equivalent condition would need to hold:
NMEUs[xu] = NMEUs[NMEUt[xu]] ∀s < t < u. (3)
This is generally not the case. Using (1), the term on the left hand side can be expanded into
NMEUs [xu] = ρ inf
p∈P
Eps [xu] + (1− ρ)Es [xu] ,
while the term on the right is given by
3Gao et al. (2018) do not provide an axiomatic foundation of their ambiguity preference model. However, the
model shares some similarity to the utility representation by Kopylov (2016). The NMEU can also be viewed as
a special case of the imprecision aversion model by Gajdos et al. (2008). Gao et al. (2018) introduce the NMEU
model in continuous time, but for ease of exposition this paper uses a discrete-time framework.
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where P ′ is the set of updated priors at time t under strong rectangularity.4 In expression (4), the
first term is simplified using the law of iterated expectations for maximin preferences under strong
rectangularity (Nishimura and Ozaki, 2007). The last term of (4) is simplified using the standard
law of iterated expectations, see equation (2). However, unless ρ = 0 or ρ = 1 (or if P is singleton
and coincides with the objective probability measure, i.e., there is no ambiguity), the second
and the third terms of (4) cannot be simplified, such that NMEUs[xu] ̸=NMEUs[NMEUt[xu]].
Intuitively, a decision maker evaluates x at each point of time as the weighted average of the
worst case scenario and the objective scenario. Hence, at a future time t > s, the remaining
possibilities are evaluated under the worst case scenario infp∈P ′ E
p
t [xu] and the objective scenario
Et [xu] to obtain NMEUt[xu]. Yet, not all of these scenarios are being considered when evaluating
the same random variable x at an earlier time s < t. In this case, the decision maker only
combines the overall worst case scenario infp∈P E
p
s [xu] and the overall objective scenario Es [xu].
In contrast, the worst case scenario from the perspective of time s of the objective scenario from
the perspective of time t (i.e., the second term of expression (4)) is not reflected when calculating
the NMEU value at time s. Similarly, the third term of (4) is not included in NMEUs[xu].
While NMEU preferences allow for an intratemporal weighting of the worst case scenario and
the objective scenario, they do not allow for an intertemporal weighting of these two probability
measures. As a consequence, NMEUs[xu] does not generally include the same information as
NMEUs[NMEUt[xu]], such that both expectations differ.
3 Implications and concluding remarks
The dynamic inconsistency of NMEU preferences implies that optimal stopping problems under
NMEU preferences are generally not recursive, as this would require expression (3) to hold
(Nishimura and Ozaki, 2007). As a result, optimal stopping problems cannot be transformed
4The model by Nishimura and Ozaki (2007) is in continuous time. However, the concept of strong rectan-
gularity is can also be applied in a discrete-time framework (Chen and Epstein, 2002; Epstein and Schneider,
2003).
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into non-stochastic HJB equations, such that no analytical solution exists. This problem arises
despite the set of priors being recursive using the strong rectangularity assumption.5
Ambiguity preferences are often difficult to reconcile with dynamic consistency (Epstein and
Schneider, 2003; Klibanoff et al., 2009). Most ambiguity preference models do not exhibit this
feature. In the literature, this problem is often overlooked. In particular, any preference model
that uses a convex combination of several dynamically consistent preferences models is generally
not dynamically consistent. This does not only apply to the NMEU model above, but also to
the the α−MEU model by Ghiradato et al. (2004) as shown in Schröder (2011) and Beissner
et al. (2019), the neo-additive capacity model by Chateauneuf et al. (2007), or the imprecision
aversion model by Gajdos et al. (2008) as discussed in Riedel et al. (2018).
When modelling real options under ambiguity in continuous time, the best approach therefore
remains using the maximin expected utility (MEU) model by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989),
as shown in Nishimura and Ozaki (2007). For discrete-time applications, the ambiguity model
proposed by Klibanoff et al. (2009) might be a suitable alternative.
5For Gao et al. (2018) this means that their results remain valid if ρ = 0 (no ambiguity aversion), ρ = 1
(extreme ambiguity aversion), or if P is singleton (i.e., there is no ambiguity).
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